A global data storage and infrastructure company faced a severe ransomware incident after an employee unknowingly triggered an attack through a fake CAPTCHA challenge.
The breach, orchestrated by Howling Scorpius, operators of Akira ransomware, lasted 42 days and exposed critical gaps in the company’s detection and response mechanisms.
How the Attack Started
The compromise began when an employee visited a car dealership website infected with a ClickFix social engineering script. This tactic disguises malware delivery as a routine security verification.
What appeared as a harmless “click to verify you’re human” prompt triggered the download of SectopRAT, a .NET-based remote access Trojan (RAT).
SectopRAT provided attackers with:
- Persistent system access
- Covert data monitoring
- Remote command execution
Attack Progression
Once embedded, attackers established a command-and-control backdoor and conducted extensive reconnaissance. They:
- Harvested domain administrator and privileged credentials
- Moved laterally via RDP, SSH, and SMB protocols
- Staged confidential archives using WinRAR
- Exfiltrated nearly 1 TB of data via FileZillaPortable
Before deploying Akira ransomware, adversaries deleted cloud backup containers, ensuring maximum impact. Encryption of multiple networks brought operations to a standstill as virtual machines went offline and ransom demands were issued.
Visibility Without Detection: The Core Weakness
Despite operating two enterprise-grade EDR platforms, the victim organization failed to detect malicious activity. Logs contained full traces of:
- Intrusion attempts
- Lateral movements
- Data staging
Yet few alerts were generated, highlighting a visibility gap between log collection and active detection—a common industry issue.
According to Unit 42’s 2025 Global Incident Response Report, similar gaps appeared in 75% of breaches examined.
Incident Response & Recovery
Unit 42 investigators deployed Cortex XSIAM to reconstruct the attack path using logs from servers, cloud systems, SecOps tools, and SIEM platforms.
Post-incident remediation included:
- Network segmentation
- Kerberos ticket rotation to prevent golden ticket attacks
- Removal of outdated endpoints
- Hardening cloud and identity configurations
Negotiations reduced the ransom demand by 68%. Recovery involved:
- Rebuilding servers and domain controllers with hardened configurations
- Adopting Unit 42 MDR for continuous monitoring
- Integrating Cortex XSIAM for unified visibility and alerting
Key Lessons Learned
Deploying advanced tools is not enough. Security effectiveness depends on:
- Properly tuned detection
- Active monitoring
- Rapid response capabilities
Organizations must close visibility gaps before ransomware groups like Howling Scorpius strike again.
